Abstract. We consider symmetric rent-seeking contests with independent private valuations of the contest prize. For a two-parameter speci…cation with continuous types, we fully characterize the Bayesian equilibrium, and study its basic properties. The willingness to waste is a hump-shaped function of the private valuation, with the median type expending the highest share of her valuation. A …rst-order (second-order) stochastic increase in the common type distribution raises (lowers) ex-ante expected e¤orts. However, neither …rst-order nor second-order stochastic dominance in valuations necessarily leads to a …rst-order stochastic dominance ranking in e¤orts. We also show that, as uncertainty vanishes, the Bayesian equilibrium converges to the Nash equilibrium of the model with complete information.
Introduction
In a classic rent-seeking contest, as proposed by Tullock (1980) , agents expend resources to improve their relative position vis-à-vis others agents with con ‡icting interests. Such contests may, for instance, relate to lobbying, political campaign, marketing, defense, or sports. In reality, incomplete information, for instance about the valuation of prizes, is a crucial feature of such contests. However, early modeling has largely abstracted from this feature. Therefore, there is a growing interest to understand the implications of asymmetric information for equilibrium behavior in rent-seeking contests.
A number of recent contributions have incorporated private information into the basic set-up. Hurley and Shogren (1998a) consider a model with one-sided private information. I.e., one agent is uncertain about the other agent's valuation of the contest prize. In this case, the uninformed agent's e¤ort becomes a risky input, which reduces her expected probability of winning. Hurley and Shogren (1998b) allow for two-sided private information and correlation. One agent has one of two possible values, the other agent has one of three possible values. In general, this speci…cation allows a numerical solution only. The authors conclude that information is a key factor in ‡uencing e¤ort expended in a rent-seeking contest. Restricting attention to a symmetric information structure, with two equally likely values for each agent, Malueg and Yates (2004) fully characterize the Bayesian equilibrium, and show that increased possibilities for ex-post lopsidedness lead to less aggressive bidding. Fey (2008) considers a model with a uniform distribution of marginal costs, and proves existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium using Schauder's …xed-point theorem. Little is known about the case when players' valuations are drawn from di¤erent distributions (cf. Wärneryd, 2010) .
In this paper, we consider symmetric rent-seeking contests in which agents have private and independently drawn valuations of the contest prize. Studied is a Bayesian equilibrium, so that an agent's optimal level of expenses depends on her valuation of the contest prize as well as on the equilibrium distribution of e¤ort levels chosen by the other agent. For continuous type distributions, this problem is in general intractable. We will point out, however, that for a particular two-parameter speci…cation with continuous types, the equilibrium indeed allows a closed-form solution. Our main result fully characterizes the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium for this speci…cation.
The characterization obtained can be used to study various properties and comparative statics of the Bayesian equilibrium. Three types of results are derived. First, we show that the willingness to waste, i.e., the share of the prize that an agent is expending for rent-seeking activities, is a hump-shaped function of the agent's valuation. Second, we study the consequences of changing the distribution of types. We …nd here that a …rst-order stochastic shift in the common type distribution unambiguously increases ex-ante expected e¤orts, while a mean-preserving spread in valuations unambiguously lowers ex-ante expected e¤orts. However, a …rst-order stochastic increase in types does not necessarily lead to a …rst-order stochastic increase in equilibrium expenses. Moreover, a second-order stochastic increase in types (i.e., a mean-preserving spread) never leads to a …rst-order stochastic decrease of bids in our speci…cation. Finally, we show that when the type interval converges to a given valuation, the support of the equilibrium strategies converges to the Nash equilibrium of the complete information game.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model is introduced in Section 2. Section 3 presents the two-parameter speci…cation with continuous types, and solves for the equilibrium. Properties and comparative statics of the Bayesian equilibrium are studied in Section 4. Concluding remarks can be found in Section 5. Appendix A replicates our comparative statics results in the two-type speci…cation. The proof of our main result can be found in Appendix B. The ex-post utility for an agent i with valuation v i , for expenses x i by agent i, and expenses x j by agent j 6 = i, is given by
Contests with independent private valuations
where p(x i ; x j ) is agent i's probability of winning (i.e., p(:; :) is the contest success function), and C i (x i ) denotes agent i's costs. We will refer to the game of incomplete information thereby de…ned as a contest with independent private valuations. 
For strictly increasing cost functions one may, as usual, rede…ne expenses in terms of disutility, and assume without loss of generality that
Moreover, while more general contest success functions can be studied, we will focus in this paper on the lottery success function given by p(x i ; x j ) =
, and by p(x i ; x j ) = 1=2 otherwise. We will impose these two assumptions throughout the paper, and note that the optimization problem in (2) is then well-de…ned.
While we will restrict attention to contests with private information about valuations, one could equivalently have studied contests with private information about costs (cf. Fey, 2008) . Indeed, the equivalence follows directly from dividing the objective function in (2) by v i > 0. However, for the present purposes, the exposition simpli…es somewhat by considering private information about valuations.
A two-parameter speci…cation
This section deals with a particular speci…cation of a contest with independent private valuations. It has been conjectured by Fey (2008) that the model with uniform cost types is not tractable. However, that conjecture leaves open the possibility that a tractable example could be found in other cases. As we will show in this section, the model indeed allows a tractable speci…cation when one is willing to deviate from the uniform case.
To this end, we introduce the following distribution on a given interval
the function
It is immediate to see that F (:jv; v) is a cumulative distribution function.
Indeed, F (:jv; v) is nondecreasing and continuous. Moreover, F (vjv; v) = 0 and F (vjv; v) = 1. We may therefore assume that the distribution of agents'
valuations is given by F (:jv; v). As mentioned before, the reason for studying this particular distribution function is that it leads to a tractable description of the Bayesian equilibrium. In the sequel, we often write F (:), dropping the reference to the parameters v and v. 
where
In this equilibrium, all types expend a strictly positive e¤ort.
A proof of this result can be found in Appendix B.
See Figure 2 for an illustration of the equilibrium strategy. 
Properties of the equilibrium
This section derives basic properties and comparative statics of the Bayesian equilibrium identi…ed in Proposition 1. We start by looking at the types' relative willingness to employ resources for ine¢ cient rent-seeking purposes.
Subsequently, we will study the consequences of stochastically changing the underlying type distribution. The …nal subsection contains a limit consideration for vanishing uncertainty.
Equilibrium e¤orts
In this subsection, we compare e¤ort levels across types. For this, we will make use of the following concept. Given a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in a rent-seeking contest, an agent's willingness to waste (Hurley and Shogren, 1998a ) is de…ned as
where v is the agent's valuation. Thus, (v) is the share of the prize that an agent with valuation v is willing to sacri…ce in the contest.
Let us brie ‡y report on what is known about the willingness to waste. Under complete information, the willingness to waste is identical across agents (cf. Hurley and Shogren, 1998b) . With two-sided asymmetric information and two equally likely types, the willingness to waste is identical across types as a consequence of the proportionality of equilibrium bids (cf. Malueg and Yates, 2004) . With continuous types, the numerical description of the equilibrium strategy (cf. Fey, 2008) suggests that the willingness to waste does not vary very much with the type.
We will show now that in our speci…cation, the willingness to waste is a hump-shaped function of v, with the median type being the most wasteful.
The …rst part of this claim follows from di¤erentiating (v) with respect to v. Indeed,
Hence, @ =@v < 0 if and only if
After some re-arranging, this inequality reads
Note now that the term on the left-hand side is strictly increasing in v.
Therefore, the willingness to waste is indeed hump-shaped (cf. Figure 3) . As the …gure suggests, the willingness to waste for the lowest and the highest valuations is identical. Indeed, using Proposition 1, it is easy to check that
Next we show that the willingness to waste is highest for the median type.
The median of the distribution (3) can be found by solving F (vjv; v) = 1=2
for v = v M . A straightforward calculation shows that the median type is given by
For instance, for the parameter values used above, v M = 12:92. To see that v M indeed maximizes the willingness to waste, one simply checks the …rst-order condition. As illustrated in Figure 3 , the willingness to waste is increasing (decreasing) in the private valuation of the prize for types below (above) the median type.
Intuitively, the hump-shape of (:) makes perfect sense. More extreme types perceive the contest as more lopsided, which reduces the willingness to waste compared to more central types.
Comparative statics
In this subsection, we use Proposition 1 to study the comparative statics of the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium in the rent-seeking contest. In particular, we are interested to better understand what happens in response to a generally higher level of valuations or in response to a more dispersed type distribution. We have therefore studied (numerically) the consequences of changing the parameters of our speci…cation to re ‡ect a …rst-order or secondorder stochastic shift in the type distribution. The main steps and results of our extensive calculations are reported upon below. This requires some preparation. The distribution of equilibrium e¤orts has the distribution function
where 1 (:) denotes the inverse function associated with the strictly increasing and continuous strategy (:). Instead of studying directly the impact of a change of parameters on G(:jv; v), it turns out to be easier to consider the -percentile x = x (v; v) of that distribution, de…ned as the unique solution of the equation G(xjv; v) = . A straightforward calculation delivers
which is quite useful for the subsequent analysis.
We may come now to the comparative statics exercises announced above.
It turns out that an increase in v does not cause bids to increase stochastically.
To see this, set v = 1 for convenience. Then An increase in v, however, provokes a …rst-order stochastic increase in the distribution of equilibrium e¤orts. To see this, note that a simultaneous and proportional increase of v and v by some factor > 0 scales up equilibrium strategies by . Therefore, to study comparative statics with respect to v, we may normalize v to one. But
Numerical tests verify that this expression is increasing in v for any 2 [0; 1]. Thus, if the lower boundary of the support interval is lifted, all types increase e¤ort. This is intuitive since uncertainty is reduced and all valuations increase.
In sum, we have shown that a …rst-order stochastic increase in the type distribution may, but need not cause a corresponding …rst-order stochastic increase in the bid distribution.
Next, we look at the ex ante expected level of expenses of an agent. A straightforward calculation using Proposition 1 delivers
It turns out that an increase in v raises the expected level of expenses. This can be seen through a numerical test after normalizing v = 1, as above.
Also an increase in v increases the expected level of expenses. Indeed, this follows immediately from the fact that the distribution of equilibrium e¤orts increases stochastically in v. Thus, a …rst-order stochastic increase in the type distribution unambiguously raises average e¤orts in our speci…cation.
1 Second-order stochastic dominance. It is useful to look at an example.
Figure 6 depicts distribution functions F (:j8; 24) and F (:ja; 30), where the parameter a = 6:23 has been determined via a numerical integration in such a way that both distributions have the same mean. In addition to the equality of the means, second-order stochastic dominance (cf. Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) requires that
for any v 0 0. These inequalities have been checked numerically. We found that expected equilibrium expenses are declining when types are subject to a shift in second-order stochastic dominance. Figure 7 shows the distribution of equilibrium expenses for our two example distributions. Here, the increase in dispersion of types causes the support interval of equilibrium bids to spread out. In particular, there is no …rst-order stochastic shift to the level of expenses. Intuitively, this is because a more dispersed type distribution entails additional, aggressive types with very high valuations. 
Diminishing uncertainty
Finally, we remark that the support of the Bayesian equilibrium strategy, as uncertainty vanishes, shrinks down to the equilibrium level of expenses of the complete-information limit game. To see this re ‡ected in the formal framework, note that as v; v ! V , we have
Hence, from Proposition 1, the limit of
is simply x = V =4, which is the Nash equilibrium level of expenses in the symmetric model with complete information. Thus, the speci…cation with complete information can be seen as a limit of continuous speci…cations with incomplete information.
Conclusion
The present paper has continued the study of contests with two-sided incomplete information. We have introduced a two-parameter speci…cation of the symmetric lottery contest with continuous types and independent private valuations. Our main result fully characterizes the Bayesian equilibrium for this speci…cation. We have used our result to derive various structural predictions related to the willingness-to-waste, stochastic dominance relationships, and vanishing uncertainty. Of course, there is no guarantee that all of these predictions can be taken for granted in the most general settings. However, one can speculate that some of them, such as the e¤ect of …rst-order and second-order stochastic dominance on expected expenses, might indeed be valid under more general circumstances.
My interest in rent-seeking contests was sparked during an interesting conversation with Karl Wärneryd.
Appendix A: Stochastic dominance in the two-type speci…cation
The purpose of this appendix is it to outline the implications of …rst-order and second-order stochastic dominance shifts in the two-type speci…cation studied by Malueg and Yates (2004) and others. More speci…cally, we will show that our comparative statics results for the continuous speci…cation can be replicated in the two-type speci…cation.
For this, consider a symmetric lottery contest with two equally likely,
It is well-known that this contest has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in which the willingness to waste is identical across types and equal to
A …rst-order stochastic increase of the type distribution corresponds to a simultaneous increase in both v L and v H . We claim that a …rst-order stochastic increase in types causes expected equilibrium e¤ort to increase, whereas a …rst-order stochastic increase in e¤orts is not a necessary consequence. To see this, note that expected equilibrium e¤ort is
It is not di¢ cult to check that this expression is increasing in both v L and v H , proving the …rst claim. To see that a …rst-order stochastic increase in e¤orts need not obtain, look at an increase of v H only. The contest becomes then more lopsided, and decreases. Hence, the equilibrium level of expenses for the low type, x L = v L , is declining.
To investigate the consequence of a second-order stochastic increase of the type distribution, write
equilibrium e¤orts
Expected equilibrium e¤ort is consequently given by
A mean-preserving spread is now tantamount to increasing . It is therefore immediate from (26) that the expected equilibrium e¤ort is declining when the type distribution undergoes a second-order stochastic dominance shift.
We claim that a …rst-order stochastic decline in bids, however, does not occur as a consequence of a mean-preserving spread in the type distribution.
The reason for this to happen is that the high type will always increase her equilibrium e¤ort. To see this formally, note that
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
This Appendix contains the proof of the equilibrium characterization in the continuous case. We will check the …rst-order condition for an interior maximum, and subsequently verify that a boundary solution is not feasible.
Assume that agent j adheres to the candidate equilibrium strategy (:),
and that agent i's type realizes to v i . Then the …rst-order condition corresponding to the agent's optimization problem reads
Using the explicit expression for agent j's strategy
as well as the density of agent j's value distribution
the …rst-order condition can be re-written as
The integral is solved by the substitution
This yields
Using
we obtain 1 x i + (B A)
optimal level of expenses for agent i:
Applying the standard formula for quadratic equations yields
where one solution drops out due to the nonnegativity requirement on x i .
Comparing this with the hypothesized equilibrium choice
for agent i shows that it satis…es the …rst-order condition. It is straightforward to verify that agent i's problem is strictly concave. Indeed,
Hence, the solution to the …rst-order condition is indeed the only solution.
This proves the …rst assertion. To see that all types invest a positive amount for rent-seeking purposes, one plugs the explicit expressions (5) and (6) into (4) to obtain
